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were indicated by the rats (87 percent), while other items scored less frequently (frag-
ments = 53 percent, bullets = 33 percent).
With the exception of Sargon, all rats scored relatively well (mean = 63.3 percent) 
with very few false positive indications (mean < 0.8 indications per 100 square metres 
[120 square yards] for the major markings S+B and 1.6 for all markings S+B+s+b). 
It should be noted that many of the false positive indications given by different rats 
were clustered, which might indicate an explosives-contaminated spot.
Although the individual success score might seem low, the overall score on the C, 
D and E boxes (those containing mines) was 100 percent after three rats evaluated 
a box (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Mean success score of the sequence of three rats that tested the 
five boxes.
The mean time for a rat to inspect a box was 32 minutes/100 square metres (120 
square yards), so when a box was inspected by three rats, this was done in 96 min-
utes. When we include handling and exchanging animals, the total average time to 
evaluate one 100-square-metre box (120 square yards) was about 116 minutes. 
Conclusions
The test area was a very dense minefield with 20 mines within an area of less than 
30 square metres (36 square yards). Besides the mines, the area was highly contami-
nated with all kinds of war materials (bullets, detonator pins, mine fragments, etc.), 
which were also often indicated by the animals, especially the detonator pins. After 
three rats evaluated a box, all mines present in that box were scored. 
The construction of risk maps based on the indications of the animals seems to be 
a very useful tool as 95 percent of the mines were found in the highest calculated risk 
area and the other mine in the second highest risk area. Using this method, more than 
80 percent of the total area evaluated by the rats could be declared free of mines.
See “References and Endnotes,” page 108 





Johan A – C – E (265sq m) 9/16 = 56.3% 0.75% 0.75%
Jullie B – C – D – E (362.5sq m) 15/20 = 75.0% 0.28% 3.00%
Josse B – C – E (262.5sq m) 10/16 = 62.5% 1.14% 1.53%
Gilgamesh A (65sq m) No mines 0.00% 1.54%
Lothar A – D (165sq m) 4/4 = 100% 2.42% 3.64%
Respect B (67.5sq m) No mines 0.00% 0.00%
Sargon D (100sq m) 0/4 = 0.0% 1.00% 1.00%
Table 3: Success scores and number of false positive indications of the rats in the five test boxes.
The mine-detection rat is harnessed and linked to the search line. Two 
leashes are connected to the glider to allow manipulation of the animal’s 
position in the box from the safe lanes. 
Mines, UXO and improvised explosive devices 
are explosive hazards that have proliferated for 
many decades. In a post-conf lict scenario, these 
are sometimes known collectively as explosive 
remnants of war.1 While global initiatives have 
limited the spread of certain types of devices 
(especially anti-personnel mines), a considerable 
problem still exists and will continue for many 
years to come.
Even where loss of life is avoided, remediation 
activities such as soil and water decontamination 
and the replacement of habitation and infrastruc-
ture are subjected to unnecessary risk, delay and 
additional costs due to the presence (suspected or 
actual) of ERW.
Technologies for the detection of explosive 
blast hazards are numerous and range from rakes 
to multi-spectral sensor arrays on autonomous ve-
hicles. Technologies for the protection of structures, 
materiel and personnel from blast are considerably 
less numerous. For such technologies to be attrac-
tive they must be simple-to-use, quick-to-deploy and 
fulfill several key functions:
• Serve as a means to mitigate the blast from a 
single explosive hazard in situ
• Provide blast mitigation for a storage area for 
explosive hazards
• Protect materiel, buildings and their occu-
pants in areas close to the site of the explosive 
hazard or an explosive hazard storage area
In order to fulfill these functions, any workable solu-
tion must have the following essential characteristics:
• Flexibility and ease of use
• Low cost
• High, scalable performance
• Low density
• Very low environmental impact
• Longevity
Here, we show that BlastWrapTM performs excep-
tionally well against these parameters.
BlastWrap Introduction
BlastWrap is a generic blast-mitigation technology 
product based on a combination of a compressible 
mineral and a flame-quenching salt.2 This mixture 
is commonly encapsulated within a semi-continuous 
panel made from two layers of formed thermoplastic 
comprising a uniform array of sealed compartments. 
The result is an adaptable and robust blast-mitigating 
wrapping constructed from lightweight, inexpensive 
materials (see Figure 1).
To protect the safety of those working to defuse mines and UXO, 
the mine action community spends considerable time and effort on 
research and development of protective equipment and neutraliza-
tion products that mitigate the effects of explosions. The author 
introduces a new technology in the form of a wrapping material 
that could be used in everything from safe transportation of explo-
sives to blast-resistant garbage bins. Inspired by some good experi-
ences, Lockheed Martin UK INSYS Ltd. has had with a particular 
blast mitigation product, this article has been written to expand on 
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BlastWrap has been used to mitigate against blast in a variety of applications. Military 
applications have focused on accident prevention in storage and during transport. Work 
has recently demonstrated the effectiveness of BlastWrap to prevent sympathetic detona-
tion between artillery shells, and work is currently underway to design a BlastWrap retrofit 
container for large-calibre ammunition.3 In the oil and gas industries, BlastWrap has been 
proven to prevent blast damage to oil pipelines.4 Civil-sector applications have focused on 
developing blast-proof litterbins (such as the BlastGard MTR range of trash receptacles5) 
and on the protection of buildings within Iraq.6
BlastWrap’s pedigree is predicated on its appliqué nature, such that existing structures 
can be transformed into blast-resistant structures via retrofit.
Table 1 describes how BlastWrap fares in terms of the essential characteristics listed above.
Civilian Safety
The development of the MTR litterbin has generated a performance curve for BlastWrap. 
The data is summarised in Figure 2. It is conceived that such a device might find use in the 
transport and storage of ERW.
EOD Safety
A temporary three-man shelter for protection of explosive ordnance disposal personnel 
has been proposed. This structure is designed to be positioned as near as 100 feet from a 
2,000-pound (900-kilogram) device. The shelter has the capability to prevent fragment 
penetration and eliminate lethal overpressure within the survival area. The possibilities for 
EOD usage have subsequently been extended (see below).
Building Protection
Two diverging approaches can be taken when protecting buildings. The most effective 
is to provide a barrier between the building and the source of the blast. The effect of the 
blast on the building is minimised. Alternatively, blast mitigation that is light and flexible 
enough to be used inside the building can be used to reduce the invasiveness of the blast 
wave. Although this approach is more discreet and controllable, it still leaves the struc-
ture vulnerable to damage that may lead to partial or complete collapse of the building, 
depending on the situation. With this in mind, BlastWrap is considered to be part of a 
necessarily more complex solution. This type of application has been proposed for use in 
Iraq to protect buildings associated with infrastructure.
Essential Characteristics Description
Flexibility and ease of use
The core technology is a granular material that can be used to fill any 
void and so conforms to any shape.
The standard product (see Figure 1) can easily create flat and  
cylindrical barriers.
Low cost
Raw material costs are quoted as $16 (U.S.) per square foot for a  
1-inch-thick layer (�140 per square meter for a 25-mm-thick layer)
High, scalable performance
Reduction of overpressure of 50 percent or more has been demon-
strated. Multiple layers can be used for large explosive devices or 
stores.
Low density
A 1-inch (25-mm) layer has an areal density of 0.6 lbs per square feet 
(3 kilograms per square meter).
Very low environmental impact Materials are non-toxic, as are the combustion products.
Longevity Will retain performance for more than 20 years.
Munitions Safety
The prevention of sympathetic detonation be-
tween artillery shells by BlastWrap suggests a consid-
erable capacity to transmute blast-wave energy over 
very short distances (see Figure 3). This is borne out 
by the measurement taken from the litterbin trials 
(see Figure 2). The reduction in blast-wave energy has 
two benefits. First, it reduces the range of lethality of 
the blast. Second, it reduces the likelihood and extent 
of secondary reactions of nearby explosive devices. 
Hence the same function can be used in dividing walls 
within magazines or other explosives storage areas to 
reduce sympathetic or secondary reaction, as well as 
around the periphery of the storage area to reduce the 
effect of any explosion on the surrounding area.
UXO Operations with BlastWrap
The operational view of handling ERW is drawn 
down into distinct phases, from planning through 
reconnaissance and identification to render safe and 
disposal operations. Removal and storage of ERW is 
also an option. To perform these functions, certain 
physical processes must be performed:
• Establishment and maintenance of safe areas
• Establishment and maintenance of demolition 
and/or storage areas
• Provision and maintenance of the associated 
logistical chain
• Provision and management of the requisite per-
sonnel and equipment
• Break-down and close-out procedures
The objective of BlastWrap deployment is to pro-
vide a portable blast barrier solution that is capable of 
considerable service life and operation in the widest 
possible operational situations. These might include
Figure 2: BlastWrap litterbin data summary. Figure by Glen Miles.
• An ERW location marker that has blast-sup-
pressing properties, particularly useful for 
managing multiple ERW in close proximity
• A mitigant to minimise the damage to equip-
ment resulting from an explosion during 
demining
• A blast tent to protect the surroundings during 
render-safe operations.
• A semi-permanent blast shield to protect safe 
areas and buildings where an explosive event is 
possible
• A lagging layer to transform a normal building 
into a safe explosive device storage area
• A sacrificial blast-damping device to the impact 
of noise and flash associated with the neutrali-
sation of ERW
• Packaging for stored explosive devices
An example is illustrated in Figure 4. This trial is 
associated with the characterisation of the MTR lit-
terbin. It is conceived that a similar approach can be 
used mitigate the effects of an IED on the surround-
ings where there is a damage issue, e.g., in a built-
up area, in a multi-story building, in the vicinity of a 
treasured landmark or building.
See “References and Endnotes,” page  108 
Table 1: The characteristics of BlastWrap.7
Figure 4: explosive trial of BlastWrap-lined container (courtesy of BlastGard International)
Figure 3: LM Uk INSyS testing of BlastWrap with 
artillery shells. 
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errata
The editorial staff of the Journal goes to great effort to make sure that what is printed in our magazine is accurate, properly documented and unbiased. However, in Issue 9.1 there were two errors for which we feel we must 
apologize. In the staff-written profile of Afghanistan (pages 66-67), our writer misinterpreted something that was written in an earlier article by Patrick Fruchet (http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/8.1/features/fruchet/fruchet.
htm) and we alluded to a conflict, which apparently does not exist. Mr. Fruchet wrote to us to clarify, saying, “Our deminers are NOT in ‘conflict’ with ISAF…” We humbly apologize for this accidental error, and thank Mr. 
Fruchet for calling it to our attention. We mistakenly attributed the article, “Mine Action in Yemen An Example of Success” (pages 10-11, 17), to Mansour Al Azi. It was actually written by Faiz Mohammad, UNDP Mine 
Action Specialist for the Yemen Mine Action Programme. We apologize to Faiz Mohammad for this error and thank him for letting us know about it.
If you find errors in the Journal of Mine Action or disagree with anything we have published, please send your comments in a “Letter to the Editor” via email to Lois Carter Fay at editormaic@gmail.com.
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